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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 11, 2011, Plaintiff Ventura Content, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) filed its complaint in this Court 
against Defendants Motherless, Inc. (“Motherless”), a New York Corporation, and Motherless’ 
President Joshua Lange (together, “Defendants”).  See Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dckt. 1).  Plaintiff 
asserted two claims against Defendants: one for direct, vicarious, and contributory copyright 
infringement, and another for violations of unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices in 
violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200.   
Defendants brought the instant motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s copyright claims, 
arguing first that they had not infringed on Plaintiff’s copyrights, and second, that even if they had, they 
were entitled to the “safe harbor defense” of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 
U.S.C. § 512.  For the reasons put forward in this Order, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to 
Section 512’s safe harbor, and thus GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that basis.  
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
Motherless owns and operates a website named “Motherless.com.”  SUF ¶¶ 8-11.2  Motherless 
allows its users to upload pictures and videos onto Motherless.com; once this material has been 
uploaded onto Motherless.com, other users are permitted to view them.  SUF ¶ 12.  The pictures and 
videos are stored on servers owned by Lange, in a facility rented by Motherless, in Texas.  SUF ¶ 41.3  
The vast majority of content available at Motherless.com—between 85 and 90%—depicts sexually 
explicit content.  SUF ¶ 14.  Any individual is permitted to become a user, and may upload and view 
content as he or she wishes.  SUF ¶¶ 44-48.  Presently, Motherless.com has approximately 728,269 
active users.  SUF ¶ 70.   
Before uploading any content, a user must agree to Motherless.com’s procedures and policies as 
set forth on its “Terms of Use” page.  SUF ¶ 51, 67.  Among other things, the Terms of Use requires 
users to affirm that they have “won or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and permission to 
use and authorize [Motherless] to use all . . . copyright . . . rights.”  SUF ¶ 72.  It further provided that 
users agree not to “post, or otherwise distribute or facilitate distribution of any content that . . . . 
infringes on any copyright right of any party.”  Id.  The Terms of Use further informs users that 
Motherless will remove content that it deems to be illegal, include material that infringes on copyright.  
Id.   
Motherless employs its own review process designed to ensure that uploaded content does not 
violate its terms of use.  SUF ¶¶ 92-99.  Motherless’ review process uses a computer software to 
generate “thumbnails”—a two-inch by two-inch image of the material displayed—of each item of 
content uploaded.  SUF ¶¶ 92-94.  For every picture uploaded, a single thumbnail is created.  SUF ¶ 93.  
For each video uploaded, Motherless’ software creates five (5) thumbnails, one displaying the image 
contained at the “20 percent” point (that is, the image that appears one-fifth of the way into the video); 
                                                 
1 This factual background includes only general facts as to the operation of the website and the 
activities giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action.  Other facts—particularly those relevant to 
Defendants’ DMCA affirmative defense—are set forth below as needed.  
 
2 Lange is the sole shareholder and director of Motherless.  SUF ¶ 3.   
 
3 Motherless.com functions similar to YouTube: it permits users to “upload” and view video 
clips and pictures.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The basic 
function of the YouTube website permits users to ‘upload’ and view video clips free of charge.”). 
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the next at the “40 percent” point ; and the final three at the sixty, eighty, and 100 percent points.  SUF ¶ 
94.  Within two to four days of a user uploading a video or picture, a Motherless employee or 
representative briefly reviews each thumbnail for “obvious signs of child pornography, copyright 
notices, watermarks, and any other information that would indicate that the picture or video contains 
illegal content or violates” the Terms of Use, and deletes any material that does so.  SUF ¶ 96.  
Defendants do not select the thumbnails to view, and they do not see any other portion of the video.  
SUF ¶ 94.   
When a user uploads content, he or she has the option of adding a title and tying the content to a 
particular “group.”  SUF ¶¶ 83-84.  “Groups” are user-created categories that make it easier for other 
users to search for particular content.  SUF ¶ 362.  Thus, for example, a user might create a group named 
“Blondes,” and “tie” a video featuring blonde performers to that group.  SUF ¶ 358.  This allows future 
users to search for, and quickly locate, the desired content.  Id.  At least some of these groups are named 
for professional porn stars, celebrities, or copyright-protected movies or shows.  SUF ¶ 365.  In order for 
users to create a group, they must get approval from Defendants; moreover, Defendants remove 
unpopular groups or ones that violates their Terms of Use.  SUF ¶¶ 363-364.  Motherless also has an 
“awards” program, through which it recognizes the user who uploads the most viewed content, or who 
uploads the most content.  SUF ¶¶ 196-197.  Motherless also selects certain content to be “prominently 
featured” on the website.  SUF ¶¶ 372.  
Plaintiff is a leading distributor of sexually explicit films.  SUF ¶ 20.  Between May 2006 and 
March 2010, Plaintiff produced, and obtained copyright registrations, for the nineteen films at issue in 
this case.  SUF ¶ 21.  Between December 200 and July 2011, eight Motherless.com users uploaded 
various portions of these nineteen films—thirty three clips in total—onto Motherless.com.  SUF ¶ 22.  
None of the thirty-three clips contained any indication that Plaintiff was the copyright owner; however, 
three of the clips contained a watermark, “videosz.com” and one contained the watermark 
“monstercockbabes.com”.  SUF ¶¶ 276-279.  Neither watermark has any connection to Plaintiff.  SUF 
¶¶ 277.   Before Plaintiff filed the instant suit on July 19, 2011, Plaintiff had made no effort to inform 
Defendants that the thirty-three clips contained copyrighted material.  SUF ¶ 300.  On November 23, 
2011, Plaintiff provided Defendants with the URLs of the thirty-three videos at issue; on the same day, 
Defendants deleted the videos from their content.  SUF ¶¶ 304-305.   
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 56(c) requires summary judgment for the moving party when the evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Tarin v. 
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Cnty. of L.A., 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 1997).  “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 
nonmoving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that 
party’s] favor.’”  Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).  “A justifiable inference is not necessarily the most likely inference or 
the most persuasive inference.  Rather, an inference as to another material fact may be drawn in favor of 
the nonmoving party . . . if it is rational or reasonable.”  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge 
Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).  The moving party may satisfy 
its Rule 56(c) burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court —that there is an absence 
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”  Id. at 325.  Once the moving party has met its 
initial burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and identify specific 
facts that show a genuine issue for trial.  See id. at 323-24; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.  A scintilla of 
evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine 
issue of material fact.  Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).  Only genuine 
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law —i.e., “where the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”—will properly 
preclude the entry of summary judgment.  See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
 
Under Local Rules 56-2 and 56-3, these triable issues of fact must be identified in the non-
moving party’s “Statement of Genuine Issues” and supported by “declaration or other written evidence.”  
See also Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 779 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e)(2) requires a party to ‘set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.’”) 
(emphasis in original).  If the non-moving party fails to identify the triable issues of fact, the court may 
treat the moving party’s evidence as uncontroverted, so long as the facts are “adequately supported” by 
the moving party.  Local Rule 56-3; see also Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 
380, 398 n.14 (1986) (“[I]t is not [the Court’s] task sua sponte to search the record for evidence to 
support the [parties’] claim[s].”); Carmen v. San Francisco United Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“A lawyer drafting an opposition to a summary judgment motion may easily show a judge, 
in the opposition, the evidence that the lawyer wants the judge to read.  It is absurdly difficult for a judge 
to perform a search, unassisted by counsel, through the entire record, to look for such evidence.”). 
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IV. PLAINTIFF’S PRIMA FACIE CASE 
In its complaint, Plaintiff asserted three federal causes of action: direct, contributory, and 
vicarious copyright infringement.  See Compl. ¶¶ 42-51.  Defendants move for summary judgment on 
the grounds that Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case as to each cause of 
action.    
 
In order to make out a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106, 
Plaintiff must satisfy two elements: first, it must show that it owns the copyright of the allegedly 
infringed material; and second, it must demonstrate that Defendants reproduced, prepared derivative 
works from, distributed, performed, or displayed a copyrighted work without its authority.  See Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs must satisfy two 
requirements to present a prima facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must show ownership of the 
allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one 
exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.”) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).   
 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff owns the copyright of the thirty-three clips at issue in this case.  
Moreover, by allowing users to upload the infringing videos onto its website, and subsequently allowing 
other users to access and view those stored images, Defendants infringed upon Plaintiff’s exclusive right 
to “display” them.  See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1160 (holding that a service provider infringed upon a 
copyright holder’s exclusive right to display its works because it was undisputed that the service 
provider’s “computers store thumbnail versions of [the copyright holder’s] copyrighted images and 
communicate copies of those thumbnails to [the service provider’s] users.”).  At a minimum, Plaintiff 
has made out a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement.  Because Defendants’ safe harbor 
defense applies equally to each of Plaintiff’s three claims, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiff 
would also be able to make out a prima facie case of vicarious and/or contributory liability.  
V. DEFENDANTS’ SAFE HARBOR DEFENSE 
 
A. Legal Background 
“Difficult and controversial questions of copyright liability in the online world prompted 
Congress to enact Title II of the [“DMCA”], the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 
(OCILLA). 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2003).”  Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).  While 
recognizing that “‘in the ordinary course of their operations service providers must engage in all kinds of 
acts that expose them to potential copyright infringement liability[,]’” Congress was nonetheless “loath 
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to permit the specter of liability to chill innovation that could also serve substantial socially beneficial 
functions.”  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, ___ F.3d ___, No. 09-55902, 2013 
WL 1092793, at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (alteration 
omitted)).  In an effort to balance these competing concerns, Congress designed the OCILLA to 
“facilitate cooperation among Internet service providers and copyright owners ‘to detect and deal with 
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.’”  Ellison, 357 F.3d at 
1076 (quoting S. Rep. 105-190, at 20 (1998); H.R. Rep. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998)).  
The two principal features of the DMCA, as amended by the OCILLA, reflect this balance.  
First, the DMCA created a “notice and takedown protocol,” through which a copyright owner who 
suspects that his or her copyright is being infringed may notify the service provider of potential 
infringing activity occurring on its network.  See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 
1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When a copyright owner suspects his copyright is being infringed, he must 
follow the notice and takedown provisions set forth in § 512(c)(3) of the DMCA[.]”).  The DMCA 
provides detailed specifications of what a copyright holder must include in its notice to the service 
provider.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).  Once a service provider receives a notice of copyright 
infringement that conforms to the statutory requirements detailed in Section 512(c)(3) (a “DMCA-
compliant notice”), a service provider “must ‘respond expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material that is claimed to be infringing.’”  Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 
1098 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (quoting Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 
F.3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (alteration omitted)).  A service provider that fails to take down 
properly-noticed material exposes itself to copyright liability.  Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.  As this 
notice and takedown regime makes apparent, “a service provider need not affirmatively police its users 
for evidence of repeat infringement.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 
2007).  Instead, as the Ninth Circuit observed, Congress made a “considered policy determination” to 
“place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material 
and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”  UMG 
Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *11.    
The second pillar of the DMCA provides “four safe harbors that preclude imposing monetary 
liability on service providers for copyright infringement that occurs as a result of specified activities.”  
UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *5.  These safe harbors are detailed in Section 512(a) through 
512(d).  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d).  Although the safe harbors “do not render a service provider 
immune from copyright infringement,” they do “protect eligible service providers from all monetary and 
most equitable relief that may arise from copyright liability.”  Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1098-99.  
“Thus, even if a plaintiff can show that a safe harbor-eligible service provider has violated her copyright, 
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the plaintiff will only be entitled to the limited injunctive relief set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).”  Id. at 
1099.  Here, Defendants assert they are entitled to the safe harbor protection detailed in Section 512(c).  
 
B. Section 512(c)  
“There are a number of requirements that must be met for a ‘service provider’ like [Defendants] 
to receive § 512(c) safe harbor protection.”  UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *5.4  Section 
512(c) provides, in relevant part:  
 
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.— 
 
(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except 
as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement 
of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides 
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the 
service provider— 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; 
 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, 
or disable access to, the material; 
 
                                                 
4 The Court assumes, without deciding, that Motherless is a service provider within the meaning 
of Section 512(c), because Plaintiff has not contended otherwise.  Other courts have found companies 
that provide services similar to that Motherless operates to be service providers within the meaning of 
Section 512(c).  See YouTube, 676 F.3d at 30 (applying Section 512(c) to claims of copyright 
infringement against YouTube); see also UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *5 n.4 (assuming, 
without deciding that the owners of a publicly accessible website that allows users to view videos 
uploaded by other users was a service provider under Section 512(c)).     
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(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control 
such activity; and 
 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in [Section 512(c)(3)], 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  Moreover, to be eligible for Section 512(c)’s safe harbor, the service provider must 
designate an agent to receive DMCA-compliant notices sent by copyright holders.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(2).  Finally, the service provider “must meet the threshold conditions set out in [17 U.S.C.] § 
512(i)[.]”  CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1109.  Section 512(i) requires a service provide to “adopt and reasonably 
implement” a repeat-infringer policy, and prohibits service providers for interfering with “standard 
technical measures” as defined in the statute.  17 U.S.C. §§ 512(i)(1)(A)-(B). 
 
Plaintiff contends that four of these requirements have not been met by Defendants.  First, 
Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of fact remain as to the “knowledge” and “expeditious take down” 
requirements of Section 512(c)(1)(A).  Second, Plaintiff argues that infringement did not occur “by 
reason of the storage at the direction of a user.”  Third, Plaintiff argues that Defendants has the right and 
ability to control infringing activity, and receives a financial benefit directly attributable to, the 
infringing activity.  Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not adopted and reasonably 
implemented a repeat-infringer policy as required by Section 512(i)(1)(A).  The Court addresses each 
contention in turn.   
 
C. Knowledge or Expeditious Take-Down 
Section 512(c)’s protections apply only to service providers that “(i) do[] not have actual 
knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;” 
“(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, [are] not aware of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent; or” “(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, act[] 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).  As the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, “to be coherent, the statute must be read to have an implicit ‘and’ between § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).” UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *9 n.11.  Thus, Section 512(c)’s 
protections apply only to those service providers that “either (1) have no actual knowledge and no 
awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent or (2) expeditiously 
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remove or disable access to infringing material of which it knows or is aware.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and alteration omitted).    
1. Actual Knowledge 
A copyright holder’s decision to forgo the DMCA notice protocol “strip[s] it of the most 
powerful evidence of a service provider’s knowledge—actual notice of infringement from the copyright 
holder.”  UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *10 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the contention that “actual knowledge” can be found if a 
service provider has a “general knowledge that its services could be used to post infringing material.”  
Id.  Instead, the record must reflect that a service provider has “specific knowledge of particular 
infringing activity.”  Id. at *11; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system 
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system 
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”).   
 
It is undisputed that, until it filed the instant action, Plaintiff did not notify Defendants that its 
copyrighted material was available on Defendants’ system.  SUF ¶¶ 306, 322-324.  Plaintiff’s failure to 
do so “stripped it of the most powerful evidence of a service provider’s knowledge.”  Plaintiff has 
offered no other evidence that Defendant had “specific knowledge of particular infringing material.”  
Moreover, it is undisputed that Defendants promptly removed the clips at issue in this suit from its 
website upon confirmation that they were infringing material.  SUF ¶¶ 300-306.  Thus, “there is no 
question on the record presented that [Defendants] lacked actual knowledge of the alleged infringing 
activity at issue.”  Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008); 
see also id. (holding that defendant did not have actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement 
because it was “undisputed that, before it filed the instant action, plaintiff provided no notice to [the 
defendant service provider] of any claimed copyright infringement”).   
 
2. Awareness of Facts or Circumstances that Indicated from Which Infringing 
Activity is Apparent 
Defendants must also not have been “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).  Under this so-called “red flag test,” the relevant 
inquiry is not whether the service provider should have known that the material was infringing, but 
whether the service provider “deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of which it was 
aware.”  3 DAVID NIMMER AND MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04[A][2] (Mathew 
Bender Rev. Ed., 2012); see also Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (“In other words, apparent 
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knowledge requires evidence that a service provider turned a blind eye to red flags of obvious 
infringement.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  As the Ninth Circuit has explained 
“The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is . . . between a subjective and an 
objective standard. In other words, the actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider 
actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement, while the red flag provision turns on 
whether the provider was subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific 
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.” 
UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *15 (quoting Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 
(2d Cir. 2012)).  Moreover, like the actual knowledge requirement, the red flag test applies “‘only to 
specific instances of infringement.’”  UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *15 (quoting YouTube, 
676 F.3d  at 31).  In other words, to find that a service provider was aware “of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent,” the record must indicate that a service provider was 
subjectively aware of facts that would have made it objectively obvious to the service provider that the 
specific copyrights owned by the Plaintiff were being infringed.   
The record here contains no such indication.  Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence 
whatsoever from which it might be inferred that Defendants were aware of “facts or circumstances” 
indicating that the clips at issue in this suit infringed upon Plaintiffs’ copyrights.  See CCBill, 488 F.3d 
at 1114 (holding that a service provider did not have red flag knowledge, despite the fact that it provided 
services to websites named “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” reasoning that “when a website 
traffics in pictures that are titillating by nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an 
attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually 
illegal or stolen”); cf. YouTube, 676 F.3d at 33-34 (holding that a report from a service provider’s 
employee that stated that “as of today, episodes and clips of the following well-known shows can still be 
found on Youtube . . . . we would benefit from preemptively removing content that is blatantly illegal 
and likely to attract criticism” and an e-mail exchange in which an employee noted that “there is a cnn 
clip of the shuttle clip on the site today, if the boys from Turner would come to the site, they might be 
pissed?” to which the service provider’s founder replied “we should just keep that stuff on the site.  I 
really don’t see what will happen” raised a material issue of fact regarding the service provider’s actual 
or red-flag knowledge) (emphasis added). 5 
                                                 
5 The Ninth Circuit has suggested—but not held—that a DMCA-compliant notification from a 
third party copyright holder might confer red flag knowledge upon a service provider.  See UMG 
Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *14 n.14 (refusing to consider whether a service provider’s apparent 
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3. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments 
Plaintiff presents four arguments that it contends demonstrate that a genuine issue of material 
fact remains as to either Defendants’ actual or red flag knowledge.  Each contention is without merit. 
a. Defendants’ Business Model is Reliant on “Mass Infringement” 
Plaintiff first attempts to elide the specific knowledge requirement by contending that 
Defendants “must” have known that infringing material had been uploaded onto their website because 
their business model is “reliant on mass infringement.”  Plaintiff’s argument is specifically tailored to 
the pornography industry: according to Plaintiffs, pornography-only websites like Motherless.com 
attract visitors by holding a large amount of free pornography.  Moreover, the only way to accumulate 
such large volumes of free pornography on its website is, according to Plaintiffs, to “get large volumes 
                                                                                                                                                                         
infringement of a third party copyright holder’s movies and television shows “would affect the 
availability of the § 512(c) safe harbor with regard to [the plaintiff’s] claims that the  [defendant service 
provider] hosted unauthorized [material]”).  But see YouTube, 676 F.3d at 34 (suggesting that a service 
provider only falls outside of Section 512(c)’s safe harbor if it has actual or red-flag knowledge of the 
“clips-in-suit” of the litigation); see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04[B][5] (noting that there is 
“reason to doubt” that “non-party notices can serve to sacrifice the Section 512(c) safe harbor for storing 
material” based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC).   
 Here, Plaintiff has identified three instances in which Defendants took between ten to fifteen 
days to remove copyrighted material identified by a third party copyright holder in what appears to be 
DMCA-complaint notification.  SUF ¶ 384.  Even assuming that such third party notices can be 
considered in evaluating whether a service provider had red flag knowledge, and that fifteen days is not 
“expeditious” within the meaning of the DMCA, these occasional lapses do not alter the Court’s 
conclusion that Defendants are entitled to Section 512(c)’s safe harbor.  The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that Defendants expeditiously removed the vast majority of infringing material upon 
receiving DMCA-compliant (and non-DMCA-complaint) notices.  Defendants have received over 3,500 
notices of infringement since Motherless.com began operating in 2008, and have removed all infringing 
material identified in those notices.  SUF ¶¶ 246, 264.  Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that, in all 
but three instances (or more that 99.99% of the time), Defendants expeditiously removed the material 
identified in these notices.  Defendants’ occasional delay in removing material identified in DMCA-
compliant notices does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants are entitled 
to Section 512(c)’s safe harbor. 
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of professionally created-pornography.”  Furthermore, Plaintiff argues, the only way professionally-
created pornography could end up on Motherless.com is via the upload of copyrighted material by users 
who are not authorized to do so, or via a business relationship with pornography producers who 
authorize the uploading of clips in exchange for banners advertising their content on the website—
relationships that, Defendants admit, they do not have.  Lane Decl. ¶¶ 93-95.    Therefore, according to 
Plaintiff, Defendants “must” know that a substantial portion of the material uploaded is copyrighted.   
 
Even crediting Plaintiff’s chain of inferences as true, Plaintiff’s argument is premised on a 
misunderstanding of the applicable test.  As the above discussion makes clear, the Ninth Circuit has 
repeatedly held that a service provider falls outside of Section 512(c)’s safe harbor only if the record 
contains evidence that a service provider failed to expeditiously remove material once it gained actual or 
red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringement.  For the reasons laid out above, there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants expeditiously removed infringing material upon gaining 
actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringement.   
 
Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants “must” have known of infringing activity was 
specifically rejected by the district court in UMG Recordings.  See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2009) aff’d sub nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 2013 WL 1092793 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) (“UMG nevertheless argues 
that Veoh is ineligible for the safe harbor because its founders, employees, and investors knew that 
widespread infringement was occurring on the Veoh system. But even if this were true and undisputed, 
UMG cites no case holding that a provider’s general awareness of infringement, without more, is 
enough to preclude application of section 512(c).”)  (emphasis added).  As that Court observed,  
No doubt it is common knowledge that most websites that allow users to contribute material 
[that] contain infringing items.  If such general awareness were enough to raise a “red flag,” the 
DMCA safe harbor would not serve its purpose of “facilitating the robust development and 
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and 
education in the digital age,” and “balancing the interests of content owners, on-line and other 
service providers, and information users in a way that will foster the continued development of 
electronic commerce and the growth of the Internet.”  
Id. (quoting S. Rep. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998); H.R. Rep. 105-551(II), at 21) (alterations omitted).  Indeed, 
the service provider at issue in UMG Recordings sought to “build or create an audience” by having a 
“wide range of content on its system,” 665 F. Supp. at 1102 (quotation marks omitted), but this business 
model alone was insufficient to avoid Section 512(c)’s safe harbor.  Plaintiff’s pornography-specific 
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argument is nothing more than a re-articulation of the argument rejected by both the district court and 
the Ninth Circuit in UMG Recordings.   
 The Court recognizes the intuitive appeal of Plaintiff’s argument: unlike the service provider in 
UMG Recordings, Defendants have offered no evidence of content “subject to copyright protection but 
lawfully available” on its systems, such as videos “created by users [or] videos that [Defendants] 
provided pursuant to arrangements it reached with major copyright holders[.]”  UMG Recordings, 2013 
WL 1092793, at *10 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  However, Section 512(c)’s safe 
harbor does not require Defendants to offer such evidence.  It requires only that Defendants demonstrate 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they had actual or red flag knowledge of 
specific instances of infringement, which they have done here.  To demand more would require 
Defendants to demonstrate that material on their website was not copyright-infringing, effectively 
undermining Congress’ “considered policy determination” of placing the “burden of policing copyright 
infringement . . . squarely on the owners of the copyright.”  Id., at *11; see also id., at *10 (“[I]f merely 
hosting material that falls within a category of content capable of copyright protection, with the general 
knowledge that one’s services could be used to share unauthorized copies of copyrighted material, was 
sufficient to impute knowledge to service providers, the § 512(c) safe harbor would be rendered a dead 
letter[.]”);YouTube, 676 F.3d at 33 (holding that surveys estimating between fifty and eighty percent 
that YouTube streamed contained copyrighted material were “insufficient, standing alone, to create a 
triable issue of fact as to whether YouTube actually knew, or was aware of facts or circumstances that 
would indicate, the existence of particular instances of infringement”); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 
600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that although a website “concede[d] that it knew as a general 
matter that counterfeit Tiffany products were listed and sold through its website[,]” such knowledge 
alone was insufficient to support a finding that the website had been willfully blind to specific instances 
of infringement). 
Finally, the intuition upon which Plaintiff relies is not supported by the facts of this case.  
Despite ample opportunity for discovery, Plaintiff has identified, at most, three instances in which 
copyright-protected material remained on Defendants’ servers for a period of more than a few days.  See 
supra note 5.  If Defendants’ business model was truly “reliant” on mass infringement, Plaintiff should 
have been able to unearth a substantial amount of copyright-protected content that remained on 
Defendants’ website well after Defendants received DMCA-compliant notices that the content had been 
copyrighted during discovery.  They have not. 
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b. Features of Motherless.com 
Plaintiff further argues that specific features of the Motherless.com website demonstrate that 
Defendants are inducing their users to upload infringing material.  Plaintiff focuses primarily on 
Motherless.com’s “group” function.  According to Plaintiff, the groups named for professional porn 
stars, celebrities, or copyright-protected movies and shows “clearly encourage[] the uploading of 
infringing material.”  However, the Ninth Circuit rejected almost the exact same argument in UMG 
Recordings.  There, the copyright holder argued that a service provider’s actual or red flag knowledge of 
infringement could be found because the service provider allowed its users to “tag” uploaded content 
under a “music videos” category.  UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *12.  The Ninth Circuit 
found this evidence insufficient to support the inference that Defendant had actual or red flag knowledge 
of specific infringing activity.  Id.  Just as permitting users to “tag” their content to a group named 
“music videos” was insufficient to demonstrate actual or red flag knowledge in UMG Recordings, 
allowing users to “group” their content under the identified categories is insufficient to establish the 
required knowledge here.  Moreover, the mere fact that users created groups based on particular 
celebrities, porn stars, or copyright-protected movies or TV shows does not demonstrate that Defendants 
had actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringing activity; as the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned in CCBill, “when a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by nature, describing 
photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an 
admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen.”  488 F.3d at 1114.  Indeed, Plaintiff has 
failed to offer evidence that the content tagged to a particular group actually displayed images of the 
celebrities, television shows, or porn stars for which the groups were named.6   
                                                 
6 The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 
1020 (9th Cir. 2013), does not compel a different result.  In Fung, the copyright holder introduced a 
wealth of evidence that Fung had actively encouraged copyright infringement, “by urging his users to 
both upload and download particular copyrighted works, providing assistance to those seeking to watch 
copyrighted films, and helping his users burn copyrighted material onto DVDs.”  Id. at 1043 (emphasis 
added).  Moreover, there was evidence that the defendant himself personally used the technology he 
provided to download infringing material.  Id.  Perhaps most importantly, the copyright holder in Fung 
identified specific files that the defendant had downloaded or helped others download that contained 
infringing material.  In contrast to the overwhelming evidence in Fung, Plaintiff here has produced no 
evidence that Defendants were aware of or should have been aware that the thirty-three clips at issue in 
this suit were copyrighted.   
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Nor do the other features of Motherless.com highlighted by Plaintiff demonstrate that 
Defendants had actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of infringement.  The fact that 
Defendants give out rewards to those users who upload the most content, or the most popular content, 
does not demonstrate that Defendants had actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of 
infringement; instead, it proves only that Defendants are encouraging uploading.  Similarly, the fact that 
Defendants place popular content where it is most likely to be seen, and choose certain content for 
prominent locations, demonstrates only that Defendants are attempting to increase their revenue, not that 
they knew that specific content highlighted was infringing.      
c. The Professional Nature of the Content on Motherless.com 
Next, Plaintiff argues that the professional nature of the content on Motherless.com demonstrates 
that Defendants knew or were aware of specific instances of infringement.  According to Plaintiff, adult 
tube sites like Motherless.com attract visitors because they hold large amounts of free pornography.  
SUF ¶ 352.  In order to obtain such large volumes, tube cites rely on professionally created 
pornography—it is impossible to generate such large quantities by relying solely on amateur content, as 
few people are willing to record and publicly post their own sex acts.  SUF ¶ 353.  Even assuming this to 
be true, “the professionally created nature of submitted content [does not] constitute[] a per se ‘red flag’ 
of infringement sufficient to impute the requisite level of knowledge or awareness to” Defendants.  Io 
Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.  Indeed, given the audio-visual equipment available to the general 
public today, “there may be little, if any, distinction between ‘professional’ and amateur productions.”  
Id.  
 
d. Defendants’ Review Process 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants “must” have known that its users were uploading 
copyrighted material because Defendants’ employees “review and approve all uploads,” many of which 
contain “watermarks or other express indicia of ownership.”  As an initial matter, the Court is skeptical 
that actual or red flag knowledge can be gained merely by reviewing content uploaded onto a website 
for the express purpose of determining whether such content is infringing.  Doing so would, in effect, 
penalize a service provider for taking measures designed to prevent copyright infringement.  
Furthermore, it would have the impermissible effect of shifting the burden of determining whether 
specific content was illegal onto the service provider, a consequence that runs directly counter to 
Congress’s purpose in creating Section 512(c)’s safe harbor.  See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1114 (“We do not 
place the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.”) 
(emphasis added); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (stating that a service provider need not monitor its 
service, nor “affirmatively seek[] facts indicating infringing activity,” in order to receive Section 
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512(c)’s harbor); UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at * 11 (“Congress made a considered policy 
determination that the [Section 512(c)’s] notification procedures would place the burden of policing 
copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting 
infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.  In parsing § 512(c)(3), we have declined to 
shift that substantial burden from the copyright owner to the provider.”) (internal citations, quotation 
marks, and alterations omitted). 
 
Even assuming that Defendants could glean actual or red flag knowledge of specific instances of 
infringement from their review process, the record contains no indication that Defendants did so in this 
case.  In support of their assertion that Defendants “must” have gained such knowledge from their 
review process, Plaintiff submitted a declaration from their expert, Frederick Lane, who reviewed 996 
clips uploaded onto Motherless.com over an eleven-hour span in November of 2012.  According to Mr. 
Lane, 66.3% of these clips were “clearly watermarked or contained other information identifying the 
content producer,” and an additional 20.3% of the clips were “professional[ly] produced or obviously 
proprietary.”  Lane Decl. ¶ 93.  Moreover, it is undisputed that Defendants’ employees review each 
picture and video uploaded onto Motherless.com for “obvious signs of child pornography, copyright 
notices, watermarks and any other information” that would indicate the content uploaded is illegal or 
otherwise violates Motherless.com’s terms of use.  Thus, according to Plaintiff, Defendants must have 
seen these watermarks and other indicia of ownership, and allowed such material to remain on the 
website. 
 
Plaintiff’s reliance on Lane’s survey is misplaced for three reasons.  First, Lane’s survey 
occurred as users were uploading clips.  Lane Decl. ¶ 93.  However, it is undisputed that Defendants’ 
employees do not review uploaded content until two to four days after a clip or picture has been 
uploaded.  SUF ¶ 96.  Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Defendants allowed clips or pictures that 
contained “watermarks or other express indicia of ownership” to remain on Motherless.com after 
reviewing those clips—indeed, Lane’s study does not indicate how many of the 996 clips he viewed 
remained on the site after Defendants reviewed them 
 
Moreover, Lane’s study failed to specify where the “watermarks or other indicia of ownership” 
appeared on each clip.  This failure is fatal to Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants saw watermarks and 
allowed material to remain on Motherless.com, in light of the undisputed fact Defendants only reviewed 
thumbnails that captured the images displayed at various intervals in the clips.  See SUF ¶¶ 92-94.  
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the “watermarks or other indicia of ownership” appeared on the 
thumbnails Defendants reviewed, and thus has failed to demonstrate that Defendants were aware of, and 
chose to ignore, specific instances of infringement.  See Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (“Although 
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one of the works did contain plaintiff’s trademark several minutes into the clip, there is no evidence 
from which it can be inferred that Veoh was aware of, but chose to ignore, it.”).   
 
  Finally, Lane does not identify what the “watermarks or other indicia of ownership” were, such 
that, had Defendants’ reviewed the clips, and seen the watermarks, it would have been “apparent” that 
the material was infringing.  For example, three of the thirty-three videos at issue in this suit contained 
the watermarks “videosz.com” and one contained a watermark “monstercockbabes.com,” entities 
completely unrelated to Plaintiff.  SUF ¶ 277.  The watermarks on Plaintiff’s clips—the only specific 
watermarks identified by Plaintiff7—did not make it “objectively obvious” to a reasonable person that 
Plaintiff owned the copyrights to the content at issue in this suit.  See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1114 (holding 
that a service provider did not have red flag knowledge, despite the fact that it provided services to 
websites named “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” reasoning that “when a website traffics in 
pictures that are titillating by nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to 
increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or 
stolen”). 
 
4. Willful Blindness 
 
Finally, in evaluating the knowledge or expeditious take-down requirement of Section 512(c), 
the Ninth Circuit has held that a service provider may not “willfully bury its head in the sand to avoid 
obtaining” specific knowledge of infringing activity.  UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *12.  
Although Plaintiff makes no argument that Defendants “willfully buried its head,” the Court concludes 
that the record contains no evidence that Defendants acted in this manner.  In this case, it is undisputed 
that Defendants has received over 3,500 take-down notices; and that in response to both complaint and 
non-compliant take down notices, Defendants automatically deletes the identified content.  SUF ¶¶ 243, 
246.  Thus, as in UMG Recordings, “the evidence demonstrates that [Defendants] promptly removed 
infringing material when it became aware of specific instances of infringement.”  2013 WL 1092793, at 
*12; see also Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 110 (holding that although a website “concede[d] that it knew as a 
general matter that counterfeit Tiffany products were listed and sold through its website[,]” such 
knowledge alone was insufficient to support a finding that the website had been willfully blind to 
specific instances of infringement). 
 
                                                 
7 Lane’s study did not provide the clips he reviewed, and thus the Court is unable to discern 
whether they contained watermarks whose content would make it “objectively obvious” that the content 
infringed upon copyrights.   
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D. Infringement occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” 
Section 512(c)’s protections apply only to service providers whose copyright infringement 
occurs “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  Plaintiff argues that 
infringement occurs at Defendants’, rather than users’, direction, because Defendants encourage users to 
upload infringing material.8  In support of this contention, Plaintiff points to the same features of 
Motherless.com—the “Groups,” the rewards program, and the placing of popular content in prominent 
locations on the website.  Plaintiff’s argument is nothing more than a repackaging of their actual and red 
flag knowledge argument: that, because of these features, Defendants “must” have known infringing 
material was being uploaded onto their website, and therefore infringement occurred at Defendants’ 
“direction.”  As discussed above, these features demonstrate, at most, that Defendants encouraged their 
users to upload material.  Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants encouraged their users to upload 
infringing material finds no support in the record. 
E. Right and Ability to Control 
In order to receive Section 512(c)’s protections, a service provider must not “receive a financial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).  Plaintiff contends that genuine issues of 
fact remain as to whether Defendants receive a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity” and as to whether Defendants have the “right and ability to control such activity.”  As the 
statute makes plain, these two elements are connected: a service provider need only demonstrate that 
they do not receive a financial benefit “directly attributable to the infringing activity” if they have the 
“right and ability to control such activity.”  Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that 
Defendants do not have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity on its system, the Court need 
not decide whether Defendants receive a financial benefit directly attributable to infringing activity.  
 A service provider does not have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity merely 
because it has the technological capacity to remove or block access to materials posted on its website or 
on its system; “something more” is required.  UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *19.  
Specifically, “in order to have the ‘right and ability to control,’ the service provider must exert 
substantial influence on the activities of users.”  Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration 
omitted).  “Substantial influence” may include “high levels of control over activities of users,” or 
“purposeful conduct.”  Id.; see also YouTube, 676 F.3d at 38 (noting that a showing of purposeful, 
                                                 
8 Plaintiff does not dispute that infringement occurred “by reason of storage” by users.     
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culpable inducement of copyright infringement “might also rise to the level of control under Section 
512(c)(1)(B)”) (citing Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937) (2005); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that a 
service provider had the right and ability to control where the service providers instituted a monitoring 
program through which users received “detailed instructions regard[ing] issues of layout, appearance, 
and content” and forbade certain types of content and refused access to users who failed to comply with 
its instructions).9 
 Here, the record lacks any evidence that Defendants exercised “substantial influence on the 
activities” of its users.  At best, the facts here demonstrate that the infringing material resided on 
Defendants’ system and Defendants had the physical ability to remove the content.  Plaintiff has failed 
to identify any other evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants exerted 
“substantial influence on the activities of its users.”  The Ninth Circuit held similar allegations 
insufficient to support a finding that a service provider had the “right and ability to control” infringing 
activity in UMG Recordings.  See UMG Recordings, 2013 WL 1092793, at *19 (holding that the service 
provider did not have the “right and ability to control” infringing activity where the record demonstrated 
that “(a) the allegedly infringing material resided on [the service provider’s] system; (b) [the service 
provider] had the ability to remove such material; (c) [the service provider] could have implemented, 
and did implement, filtering systems; and (d) [the service provider] could have searched for potentially 
infringing content.”).  Moreover, the mere fact that Defendants had Terms of Use, and enforced its 
policy by removing material and terminating users who violated those terms, does not remove Section 
512(c)’s protections.  See Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-51 (rejecting a copyright holders’ argument 
that a service provider had the “right and ability to control” infringing activity because the service 
provider conducted occasional “spot checks” of videos uploaded onto its website for compliance with its 
policies). 
                                                 
9 Plaintiff contends that the appropriate test for determining “right and ability to control” under 
Section 512(c)(1)(B) is the test for common-law vicarious liability set forth in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry 
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 1996) and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).  The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected this argument in UMG Recordings.  
See 2013 WL 1092793, at *16. 
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F. Reasonably adopted and implemented, and informed its members of a policy 
that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of members 
who are repeat infringers 
Finally, to be entitled to Section 512(c)’s safe harbor, Defendants must satisfy the “threshold” 
requirements of Section 512(i).  This element can be broken down into five sub-parts: 
1. The service provider must adopt a termination policy; 
2. The policy must provide for termination from the service provider’s system or network of 
subscribers and account holders who qualify as “repeat infringers”; 
3. The service provider must inform its subscribers and account holders about the policy; 
4. The termination need only occur in “appropriate circumstances”; and, 
5. The service provider must reasonably implement the policy. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).  Plaintiff concedes that that Motherless has adopted an adequate termination 
policy and informs its subscribers of it, but argues that Plaintiff has not “reasonably implemented” that 
policy by failing to terminate repeat infringers in “appropriate circumstances.”   
The “reasonable implementation” requirement of Section 512 consists of two sub-elements: 
“implementation” and “reasonableness.”  See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1109-1110.  A service provider 
“implements” its termination policy if it has 1) a working notification system; 2) a procedure for dealing 
with DMCA-compliant notifications; and 3) does not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting 
information needed to issue such notifications.  Id. at 1109.  Moreover, a service provider must have in 
place some system to track DMCA-complaint notices of infringement, so that a service provider can 
identify “repeat infringers”—that is, users who post infringing material on multiple occasions.  See id. at 
1110  (“[A] substantial failure to record webmasters associated with allegedly infringing websites may 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the implementation of the service provider’s repeat infringer 
policy.”).  As to the reasonableness prong, “[t]he [DMCA] permits service providers to implement a 
variety of procedures, but an implementation is reasonable if, under ‘appropriate circumstances,’ the 
service provider terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.”   Id. at 1109-10 (citing 
17 U.S.C. § 512(i); Corbis, 351 F.Supp.2d at 1102). 
Plaintiff concedes that Defendants have implemented a policy by providing a working 
notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-complaint notifications, and does not actively 
prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to issue such notifications.  See Lange 
Decl. ¶¶ 236-271.  Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants sufficiently track users with a 
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history in of infringing.  See Lange Decl. ¶¶ 256-257.  The gravamen of Plaintiff’s charge is that 
Motherless has not “reasonably” implemented that policy.   
In support of Defendants’ contention that they have “reasonably” implemented their repeat 
infringer policy, Defendants submitted undisputed evidence that they have terminated between 1,300 
and 2,000 users for alleged copyright infringement.  See SUF ¶¶ 269-270.  In response, Plaintiff 
identified nine users—the eight users who uploaded the thirty-three clips at issue in this suit, and one 
other user—it alleges are repeat infringers who should have been terminated, but were not.   
Even assuming that Defendants should have terminated these nine users, Defendants’ failure to 
do so does not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants failed to “reasonably implement” 
their termination policy.  The DMCA requires only that the policy be “reasonably”—not “perfectly”—
implemented, and thus “occasional lapses are not fatal to the service provider’s immunity.”  3 NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.10[D][3].  Assuming Plaintiff’s best case—that Defendants identified, and 
terminated 1,300 repeat infringers—Defendants’ failure to terminate nine of these users (or less than 
.01% of recognized repeat infringers) is nothing more than an “occasional lapse” in the implementation 
of its policy. 
Moreover, Defendant was not required to terminate at least eight of the nine users identified.  As 
noted above, a service provider is only required to terminate a repeat infringer under “appropriate 
circumstances.”  Although Section 512(i) “does not clarify when it is ‘appropriate’ for service providers 
to act[,]” CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1111, courts have consistently interpreted this phrase as requiring 
termination only when a service provider has sufficient evidence of a user’s “blatant, repeat 
infringement of a willful and commercial nature.”  Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; see also CCBill, 488 
F.3d at 1109 (“[I]mplementation is reasonable if, under ‘appropriate circumstances,’ the service provider 
terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.”); Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 
164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 703 (D. Md. 2001) aff’d sub nom. CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 
544 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that Section 512(i) “is designed so that flagrant repeat infringers, who 
‘abuse their access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others should 
know there is a realistic threat of losing access.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, Part 2, at 61) 
(alteration omitted) (emphasis added).  
 
In this case, Defendants had no evidence that three of the nine users identified by Plaintiff had 
uploaded infringing content prior to the filing of the instant suit.  SUF ¶¶ 287, 289, 291.10  By definition, 
                                                 
10 Although Defendant had received take down notices related to content uploaded by one of 
these three users before the instant law suit, those notices were not DMCA-compliant.  A non-compliant 
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these users cannot be classified as “repeat” infringers.  Defendants did have evidence that three other 
users had infringed once before.  SUF ¶¶ 284, 285, 288.  Defendants also had evidence that one other 
user had infringed twice before.  SUF ¶ 286.  Although these four users were arguably “repeat” 
infringers, their infringement was in no way “blatant” or “flagrant,” thus excusing Defendants’ failure to 
terminate them. 
As to the final two users (of the nine Plaintiff asserts are “repeat infringers”), Defendants only 
received one notice that one—BBQ69—had uploaded infringing material.  SUF ¶ 386.  Although the 
notice received by Defendants indicated that BBQ69 had uploaded twenty-one infringing works, a 
service provider’s failure to terminate users who upload multiple videos that are identified in a single 
DMCA notice does not remove Section 512(c)’s immunity.  See UMG Recordings., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 
1118 (“As to [the copyright holder’s] objection that [the service provider] terminates a user only after a 
second warning, even if the first warning was spurred by a DMCA notice identifying multiple 
infringements, [the copyright holder] points to nothing in the statute, legislative history, or case law 
establishing that such a policy is not reasonable or appropriate.”); see also Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 
1100-01 (“[T]he key term, repeat infringer, is not defined . . . . The fact that Congress chose not to adopt 
such specific provisions when defining a user policy indicates its intent to leave the policy requirements, 
and the subsequent obligations of the service providers, loosely defined.”).  
 
Finally, Defendants received four DMCA-complaint notices related to content uploaded by the 
last user, Kristy7187, between February 8, 2011 and August 9, 2012.  SUF ¶ 290.  However, Defendants 
terminated Kristy 7187 in August of 2012.  Id.  Although Defendants perhaps should have terminated 
her earlier, their isolated failure to do so does not evidence a failure to “reasonably implement” their 
repeat infringer termination policy.11 
                                                                                                                                                                         
notice may not be used as evidence that a service provider knew of, and tolerated, a users’ repeated 
copyright infringement.  See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1113. 
11 Indeed, whether Kristy7187 should have been terminated is debatable.  As a leading treatise 
has observed, “Courts have taken an ad hoc approach to deciding what makes an infringer a ‘repeat’ 
infringer, weighing both the number of infringements and the period of time that separates them.”  2 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.3.2 (2012) (citing Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 
2012) (holding that a service provider had reasonably implemented its repeat infringer termination 
policy where a user was only removed after receiving three separate DMCA-complaint infringement 
notices)). 
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Plaintiff points to one other item of evidence in support of its assertion that Defendants did not 
reasonably implement their repeat infringer policy.  In the termination notice Lange sent to Kristy7187, 
Lange stated that “[t]he DMCA law clearly says we have to terminate repeat offenders.  Your past 
DMCA notices have been spread out over some time, and based off of the amount of files you had, it 
wasn’t a problem.”  SUF ¶ 393.  This notice might support the inference that Defendants regularly 
tolerate repeated, blatant copyright infringement by users so long as the instances of infringement are 
sufficiently spread out and the amount of material uploaded is sufficiently voluminous.  Yet the 
evidence fails to demonstrate that this is the case.  Out of more than 700,000 users who have been active 
over the site since its inception, Plaintiff has identified only one—Kristy 7187—who was arguably 
allowed to remain on Defendants’ system despite evidence that she or he repeatedly and blatantly 
uploaded infringing activity.  Indeed, Plaintiff failed to so much as ask Lange about the e-mail he sent to 
Kristy7187 during Lange’s deposition, much less ask him whether he similarly allowed other users to 
remain active on Motherless.com once he had evidence that they repeatedly, blatantly uploaded 
copyrighted material.  This one episode cannot create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Defendants’ “reasonably implemented” their repeat infringer termination policy in light of the 
undisputed record of compliance described above.   As Nimmer has observed, the DMCA requires only 
that the policy be “reasonably”—not “perfectly”—implemented, and thus “[an] occasional lapse[ is] not 
fatal to the service provider’s immunity.”  3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.10[D][3].   
 
VI. REMEDY 
Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Defendants 
are entitled to Section 512(c)’s safe harbor.  Plaintiff’s remedy is therefore “limited injunctive relief set 
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).”  Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.  Section 512(j) permits a district court to 
issue an order “restraining the service provider from providing access to infringing material or activity 
residing at a particular online site on the provider’s system,” or “restraining the service provider from 
providing access to a subscriber or account holder who is engaging in infringing activity . . . by 
terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder[.]”  17 U.S.C. § 512(j).  However, 
Defendants have already removed the thirty three infringing clips at issue in this case; thus, Plaintiff’s 
request for injunctive relief is moot.  See Io Group, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-55 (“In this case, before it 
ever received notice of any claimed infringement, [the service provider] independently removed all adult 
content, including video files of plaintiff’s works . . . . Thus, any injunctive relief to which [the 
copyright holder] would be entitled [under Section 512(j)] is moot.”). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons put forward in this Order, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for partial 
summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s copyright claims, and DISMISESS those claims WITH 
PREJUDICE.   
 
 As to Plaintiff’s remaining state law cause of action, in its Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that this 
Court had supplemental jurisdiction over that claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Section 1367 confers 
federal courts with jurisdiction over state-law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within 
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 
United States Constitution.”  28 U.S.C. § 1367.  “A state law claim is part of the same case or 
controversy when it shares a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal claims and the state 
and federal claims would normally be tried together.”  Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
Plaintiff’s state law claim asserts violations of California Business and Professions Code § 
17200.  Section 17200, also known as California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), “allows individual 
plaintiffs to bring claims for unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices.”  Gutierrez v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, NA, 704 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2012).  “To be ‘unlawful’ under the UCL, the [alleged 
business practice] must violate another ‘borrowed’ law.”  Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 
1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Cel–Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 
4th 163, 180 (1999) (“[S]ection 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful 
practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “Virtually any state, federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action under section 
17200.”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 1168 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).   
In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant has violated 18 U.S.C. § 2257.12  Section 2257 
is part of Congress’ “comprehensive statutory scheme to eradicate sexual exploitation of children.”  
United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1990).  The statute requires any person who 
produces sexually explicit conduct to “create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to 
every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction.”  18 U.S.C. § 2257(a).  Those records must 
document each performer’s “name and date of birth, and require the performer to provide such other 
                                                 
12 Although Section 2257 is a federal statute, it does not create a private right of action.  See 
Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 890 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“Congress did not create a 
private right of action for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2257.”). 
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indicia of his or her identity.”  18 U.S.C. § 2257(b).  In its complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 
are required to, and do not, keep the records required by Section 2257.    
These allegations do not share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with Plaintiff’s copyright 
claims.  Defendants’ failure to keep records has little, if anything, to do with the copyrighted material 
that appeared on their system.  Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these 
claims.  
However, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff may have an alternative basis for liability—
diversity jurisdiction.  From the face of the complaint, it appears that there is complete diversity between 
the parties.  However, Plaintiff does not allege an amount in controversy as to its Section 17200 claim.  
Thus, if Plaintiff wishes to pursue its state-law claim in this Court, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to file a 
notice with this court within twenty days of the date of this Order demonstrating that the amount-in-
controversy requirement is met as to this claim.  Failure to do so will result in dismissal of Plaintiff’s 
claim WITHOUT prejudice.   
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